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We show that a recurrent neural network is able to learn a model to represent sequences of
communications between computers on a network and can be used to identify outlier network traffic.
Defending computer networks is a challenging problem and is typically addressed by manually
identifying known malicious actor behavior and then specifying rules to recognize such behavior in
network communications. However, these rule-based approaches often generalize poorly and identify
only those patterns that are already known to researchers. An alternative approach that does not
rely on known malicious behavior patterns can potentially also detect previously unseen patterns.
We tokenize and compress netflow into sequences of “words” that form “sentences” representative
of a conversation between computers. These sentences are then used to generate a model that learns
the semantic and syntactic grammar of the newly generated language. We use Long-Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) cell Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) to capture the complex relationships and
nuances of this language. The language model is then used predict the communications between
two IPs and the prediction error is used as a measurement of how typical or atyptical the observed
communication are. By learning a model that is specific to each network, yet generalized to typical
computer-to-computer traffic within and outside the network, a language model is able to identify
sequences of network activity that are outliers with respect to the model. We demonstrate positive
unsupervised attack identification performance (AUC 0.84) on the ISCX IDS dataset which contains
seven days of network activity with normal traffic and four distinct attack patterns.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defending computer networks from unauthorized use
has become an increasingly critical challenge for govern-
ments, industries, and private individuals in recent years.
An estimated $75 billion were spent globally on cyberse-
curity services and solutions in 2016 [1]. Meanwhile, the
threat actors targeting vulnerable systems have expanded
from the perceived lone-wolf hackers of the 1990’s and
early 2000’s to include advanced and well-funded crimi-
nal groups and state actors. Previous intrusion detection
system (IDS) paradigms that relied on signature-based
matching against known attacks and attack vectors are
no longer sufficient. An alternative approach to cyber-
security detection frames the problem as one of anomaly
detection; a model of network activity is estimated and
future activity on the network is evaluated with respect
to its probability under the learned model. We use a
long short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural net-
work (RNN) to learn ordered sequences of network traffic
representative of a computer network and then evaluate
the ability of this model to detect malicious activity on
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that network. We demonstrate that LSTM RNNs are
able to detect patterns of traffic indicative of malicious
computer system use without the assistance of labeled
training data and without visibility into each machine’s
internal state or processes. Further, we provide evidence
that unsupervised models can detect traffic indicative of
malicious activity even when they are trained on network
data that are not representative of a pristine (attack-free)
traffic. This should boost confidence in the use of ma-
chine learning for cybersecurity applications, a domain
for which pristine training data are costly and rarely
available.
II. BACKGROUND
We motivate our research by drawing on cutting-edge
research in two active fields: cybersecurity and natu-
ral language processing (NLP). Cybersecurity is a broad
field and different networks pose different challenges to
researchers and practicioners. The challenge of interest
to us is briefly detailed alongside alternative perspectives
on cybersecurity. We also note that cybersecurity appli-
cations have, in recent years, seen an increase in the use
of machine learning and statistical models to accomplish
tasks that were previously often performed via signature-
based matching methods. Building on this trend, we note
similarities between the cybersecurity problem as repre-
sented by network logs (i.e. netflow) and the challenges
inherent to modeling natural languages.
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A. Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity encompasses a wide range of problems that
includes, but is not limited to, intrusion detection, mal-
ware detection, preventative security (e.g. access con-
trols, 2 factor authentication, security training), network
monitoring, and associated investigative and remediation
efforts. While we believe that threats manifest in a num-
ber of ways and may be invisible to any single detection
method or even combination of methods, we nonetheless
focus our efforts here solely on network monitoring to
identify anomalous network traffic.
Network traffic data generally consist of logs summariz-
ing the communications between network-connected de-
vices. Often these data are aggregated such that the
available information includes a start time and duration
for the communications represented by a single record.
Each record includes two Internet Protocol addresses
(IP addresses) representative of network-connected ma-
chines. Due to the dynamic assignment of IP addresses
and to the actual structure of networks themselves, it
cannot be assumed that any given IP maps consistently
to the same physical device or even to any single device
at a given time. Additionally, network logs generally in-
clude measures of bytes and packets transferred during
the duration of a communication as well as the ports and
protocols used in the communication. Network logs of
this type are frequently collected via dedicated hardware
installed at strategic points within the network of inter-
est.
Because network traffic logs (flow) can be collected pas-
sively by dedicated hardware, their collection is typically
invisible to the users of other hardware on that network.
Network logs are also relatively small when compared to
other log types available for cybersecurity purposes like
host-based logs or full packet capture. Combined, the
unobtrusive nature of these data combined with their
(relatively) small storage footprint make them a popu-
lar choice for organizations implementing a cybersecurity
posture.
Because of their ubiquity, a number of tools take advan-
tage of network traffic logs for cybersecurity monitoring.
Signature-based tools can utilize network traffic logs to
validate traffic against blacklists of known-bad IPs, to
monitor the volume of traffic and enforce volume or rate-
based limits, and to monitor port and protocol usage to
identify the use or attempted use of services that should
not be present. Somewhat more complex approaches in-
clude the use of SQL-like queries to perform operations
on flow data to make rule-based matching more precise
or customized to a particular network’s needs. For in-
stance, regular expressions might be used to parse user
agent strings or internet addresses to identify keywords
or tokens of interest.
Recent work has used machine learning to circumvent the
need for rule sets that are necessarily specified a priori.
Machine learning has also been applied to other
cybersecurity-relevant data types. For example, Veera-
machaneni et al. present a system for user-in-the-loop
machine learning on web logs and firewall logs [2]. Re-
searchers have demonstrated that LSTM RNNs can be
trained on system processes and utilized for intrusion de-
tection [3]. Supervised network traffic and attack classifi-
cation has also been demonstrated with LSTM RNNs.[4].
B. Natural Language Processing
Neural network models have recently achieved state-of-
the-art performance on a number of NLP tasks. The
popular 2vec family of models including word2vec and
doc2vec, among others, has been applied to great success
in projecting sparse and high-dimensional natural lan-
guage representations into low-dimensional continuous-
valued vector spaces while retaining the semantic and
syntactic relationships of the original language [5, 6]. An-
other line of research has approached language modeling
as a sequence problem in the vein of Markov models and
suffix tree language models [7, 8]. Recent work in this
area has utilized LSTM RNNs for language modeling
[9]. Combining LSTM RNNs with character-level con-
volutional neural networks (CNNs) has been shown to
produce results comparable to the state-of-the-art with
fewer parameters than comparable models [10].
Network flow metadata share characteristics of natural
language. Communications between networked devices
are captured in ordered sequences, and we expect these
communications to follow a set of rules, similar to a gram-
mar, determined by the services and protocols they uti-
lize. However, the underlying grammatical rules are typ-
ically obscured from the analyst and so explicitly mod-
eling them is impossible. Therefore, unsupervised lan-
guage models are a natural choice for inferring the data
generating processes of network metadata.
III. DATA
We utilize a public dataset for intrusion detection (IDS)
tasks from the University of New Brunswick’s Canadian
Institute for Cyberseurity (CIC) and the Information Se-
curity Centre of Excellence (ISCX), hereafter referred to
as ISCX IDS [11]. The dataset represents seven days of
simulated network traffic with a variety of attack behav-
iors including infiltration, denial of service (DoS), dis-
tributed denial of service (DDoS) via IRC Botnet, and
brute force SSH attacks. The raw data, provided in the
form of full packet capture (PCAP) is roughly 90 giga-
bytes.
We are interested in anomaly detection via network
flow metadata and so focus on a pre-processed flow-
style dataset that accompanies the full ISCX IDS data.
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This metadata table contains just over 2 million flow
records occurring between June 11, 2010 and June 17,
2010. After de-duplicating some records, we are left with
1.9 million entries. These metadata consume only 412
megabytes of disk space and make clear the storage cost
(not to mention computational cost) advantage of flow
over PCAP.
From these flow data, we produce ordered sequences of
flows per IP-pair (dyad). Dyads are undirected and so
the pair IPaIPb is equivalent to IPbIPa. Within each se-
quence, a single flow record corresponds to a single token,
a word in the NLP analogy. We perform two sets of anal-
yses that require distinct sequences. In the first method,
tokens are of the form Protocol:floor(log2(bytes)).
An example sequence may therefore look like IPaIPb:
TCP:10|TCP:12|UDP:04. We refer to these as proto-byte
sequences. In the second set of analyses, we look to ports
as our tokens. In particular, we use heuristics to deter-
mine which port, per flow, is likely to be the service port.
For each port pair, we retain the lowest port value and
drop the higher port value. We also collapse all ports
above 10,000 to a single token as a rough approxima-
tion of ephemeral or otherwise uncommon ports. A se-
quence of ports for a given IP-pair looks like IPaIPb:
80|80|443|80. There are 168,218 dyad hours in the
data.
Sequences are formed with a rolling window applied only
within (not across) dyad-hours. A dyad-hour consists
of all flow records between two IP addresses within a
single hour. Aggregating to the dyad-hour allows us to
make high-resolution predictions of attacks; we recognize
that dyads may exhibit malicious behavior during some
time periods and non-malicious behavior during others
and hope to be able to distinguish between them. The
beginning of each sequence is zero-padded and a mask is
applied at the modeling stage to avoid biasing results due
to the padding. Dyad-hour units are classified as attacks
if they contain at least one record labeled “attack” in the
source data.1 Our models are fully unsupervised with
respect to “attack” labels; we use these labels only for
validation and not for model training.
IV. METHODOLOGY
We use a LSTM RNN to model flow sequences. Our
model comprises two stacked, bidirectional, LSTM lay-
ers, a single dense layer activation, and a single fully-
connected softmax output layer. A 20% dropout rate
1 An alternative is to label those dyad-hour units as attacks if
the sum of “attack” records is greater than the sum of “normal”
records. In practice, we find that there are very few such IP-pair-
hours in the data and therefore opt for the simpler aggregation
rule.
is applied between each layer. Each LSTM layer is
composed of 50 hidden cells with linear activation and
on the first layer and rectified linear activation on the
second layer. In addition, an initial embedding layer
projects input sequences from V unique tokens into a
dense 100-dimensional vector space. We train on the en-
tire dataset with a ten-token sliding window. For each
ten-token window, the model is trained to predict the
subsequent (eleventh) token. Left-censored sequences are
zero-padded and zero-masking is applied in the training
stage to prevent biasing the model. The model is dia-
grammed in Figure 1.
Unsupervised cybersecurity applications require learning
a model of the typical network behavior against which
newly-observed behaviors can be evaluated. Presumably,
malicious activities will manifest as anomalies with re-
spect to the baseline model. For some networks, it may
be conceivable that a “clean” baseline can be made; it
may be possible to collect data on the network during
a period for which it is likely that no attempts at net-
work misuse or abuse have occurred. However, for many
networks, ensuring a clean collection period for baseline
model estimation may be infeasible or impossible. We
test and compare both scenarios here.
In the clean baseline test, we train our network model on
the first day and a half of the ISCX dataset for which we
know that no attacks are present. In the dirty baseline
test, we train our network on the full ISCX dataset such
that attack and non-attack traffic are both learned by the
model. Once a model of the network traffic is learned,
we use that model to predict values for every flow in the
dataset. We use multiclass logarithmic loss as an “outlier
score;” we assume that poorly-predicted datapoints are
more likely to be those associated with anomalous or ma-
licious traffic. The maximum observed logarithmic loss
value per IP-dyad hour is taken to be that observation’s
outlier score.2
In addition to the clean and dirty baseline tests, we also
conducts tests in which DoS and DDoS attacks have been
omitted from the data. Because flows are not labeled by
attack category in the data, we opt to remove the en-
tirety of both June 14 and June 15 from the dataset to
ensure that the DoS and DDoS attacks are not present
for training or model evaluation. We refer to these tests
2 Our choice to use the maximum observed value is motivated
by both design considerations and observed performance. Us-
ing the maximum observed outlier score per dyad-hour to score
that dyad-hour matches our decision to consider dyad-hours as
“attacks” if they contian at least a single flow record that is des-
ignated “attack.” In other words, our outlier score aggregation
method corresponds to our validation data aggregation method.
Additionally, we observed that the maximum value aggregation
rule performed better with respect to our selected model perfor-
mance metrics than did the averaging of ourlier scores. For a
discussion of aggregation rules and outlier ensembles, see [12].
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embedding_1_input: InputLayer
embedding_1: Embedding
bidirectional_1(lstm_1): Bidirectional(LSTM)
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bidirectional_2(lstm_2): Bidirectional(LSTM)
dropout_2: Dropout
dense_1: Dense
dropout_3: Dropout
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FIG. 1: Model architecture.
as NoDoS. It is possible that DoS and DDoS attacks, by
virtue of their high-volume traffic profiles, could result
in the models overfitting to these types of attacks and
therefore being unable to flag them as anomalies. Alter-
natively, if the models can accurately flag DoS and DDoS
attacks, the volume of these activities will inflate perfor-
mance metrics due to the imbalance of DoS-like attack
flows versus other attack type flows.
V. RESULTS
Our models are able to identify anomalous network traf-
fic in both the clean baseline and dirty baseline scenar-
ios. Model performance is depicted with Receiver Oper-
ating Characteristic (ROC) plots in Figures 2 through 4.
ROC plots depict the False Positive Rate (FPR) versus
the True Positive Rate (TPR) over all possible threshold
values. If the observed curve in a ROC plot falls along
the diagonal line x = y, the model is assessed to per-
form no better than random chance. A perfect curve is
one that forms a right angle at FPR=0.0 and TPR=1.0
which would indicate that all assigned probabilities to the
positive class (here malicious activity) are greater than
assigned probabilities to the negative class (here benign
activity). The Area Under the Curve (AUC) is the value
attained by integrating over the ROC curve. An AUC of
1.0 indicates perfect classification and an AUC of 0.5 in-
dicates random chance. Models that perform better than
chance should attain AUC values in the range (0.5, 1.0].
We elect to use AUC as our evaluation metric because
we want to respect the unsupervised nature of our stated
problem. Because we do not have labeled data with
which to calibrate a threshold and we offer no unsuper-
vised method for selecting an anomaly or attack thresh-
old, we prefer a performance metric that is agnostic to
threshold. Without an understanding of the baseline rate
of attack observations in the raw data, for example, we
cannot estimate an appropriate threshold with which to
hard partition the data and calculate accuracy. The out-
lier scores produced by our method, logarithmic loss, can
be thought of as an ordered list that ranges from non-
anomalous to anomalous [0.0,+∞).
We find that the protocol-bytes feature set outperforms
the service port feature set in all tested scenarios. Look-
ing at subfigure a of Figures 2 through 4 we can see
that all models based on proto-byte sequences produce
higher AUC scores than any model based on service port
sequences. This indicates that dyad-hours that contain
flows labeled “attack” are, on average, scored higher with
respect to outlier score than “non-attack” dyad-hours.
This holds even for the NoDoS model in which DoS and
DDoS attacks have been removed. This is encouraging
because it indicates that proto-byte sequences can iden-
tify attack types that are not inherently high-traffic and
high-byte-count.
The relatively poor performance of service port sequences
in identifying cyberattack activity is puzzling. The rela-
tively high AUC score of the dirty baseline service port
model indicates that this feature set does in fact distin-
guish normal network behavior from attack behaviors.
Why the performance of models based on service port
sequences drops off in the subsequent models, clean base-
line and NoDoS, is unclear.
We also find that the dirty baseline models outperform
clean baseline models in all cases. This should be encour-
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FIG. 2: ROC plots for dirty baseline models.
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FIG. 3: ROC plots for clean baseline models.
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FIG. 4: ROC plots for NoDoS models.
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aging for cybersecurity practitioners who may be unable
to obtain a sample of guaranteed clean traffic from their
network. It is indicative that well-trained models are able
to identify, at least in some circumstances, malicious net-
work traffic even when those behaviors are present in the
model’s training data. We suspect that the dirty base-
line models may outperform the clean baseline models
due to training dataset size. The selected deep LSTM
models require the estimation of large number of param-
eters and model performance may suffer when the sample
dataset is insufficiently large to precisely estimate those
parameters. Because the dirty baseline training dataset
is much larger than the clean baseline, those models may
better learn the common behaviors of the network. In
subsequent work, we hope to use subsampling of the dirty
baseline training data to test this hypothesis.
The NoDoS proto-byte sequence model performs sub-
stantively the same as the dirty baseline proto-byte se-
quence model with respect to attack detection. This pro-
vides some reassurance that proto-byte sequences, as a
feature set, are robust to attack type or characteristic.
While we evaluate overall model performance here, we
also recognize that positive performance results do not
necessarily guarantee efficacy in field applications. High
AUC scores, for instance, may indicate that most attacks
in the data are scored as such by the model, but that
high false positive rates nonetheless make the inspection
of these results tedious, time-consuming, or impossible.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that network behaviors can be
learned from traffic metadata using LSTM RNNs and
applied for anomaly detection (i.e. cybersecurity) pur-
poses. This work is important because it offers cyberse-
curity practitioners an effective and unsupervised tool for
network protection that requires the collection and stor-
age of only readily-available and relatively cheap network
metadata. Furthermore, our method learns a model of
the actual network to be protected and we believe it is
therefore widely applicable across a variety of computer
network infrastructures and architectures.
In future research we hope to validate our method in
real-world settings against known adversaries. The most
effective model presented here (dirty baseline proto-byte
sequences) is trained on the full dataset to be scored, a
method that we recognize will not translate well into an
operational setting. Instead, we recommend future re-
searchers in this area consider a streaming or mini-batch
framework in which a model is learned on a temporal
subset of network data and used for scoring new data
as it is generated. This should minimize computational
requirements as training the LSTM can be done periodi-
cally and when compute resources are cheap or otherwise
available. We also believe that combining unsupervised
models with user-in-the-loop feedback mechanisms and
supervised learning could provide valuable performance
improvements with respect to fewer false positive alerts
and greater confidence in the identification of common
attack vectors. In addition, we recognize that not all cy-
bersecurity anomalies of interest will necessarily manifest
in sequences of flow metadata. Ongoing efforts to con-
ceptualize the network-modeling problem as one of signal
processing, clustering, and network analysis have shown
promise in identifying various classes of anomalous net-
work behaviors.
We hope that our efforts here will motivate the neces-
sity for and encourage further research into unsupervised
anomaly detection on computer network metadata. Cy-
bersecurity is an open problem and one that is very costly
to businesses, institutions, governments, and individuals,
all of whom rely daily on the integrity of networked sys-
tems. We believe that incorporating unsupervised net-
work modeling and monitoring techniques with existing
signature-based cybersecurity solutions will enable cyber-
security practitioners to finally get ahead of malicious
actors by improving our ability to detect adversary be-
havior in a timely manner even when adversaries utilize
previously unknown vulnerabilities.
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